national security

Commentary: 5G Is The Essential National Security Imperative Of Our Time

By: Christopher Burnham

The hype around 5G is real—it will change how we communicate, travel, fight wars, drive (or not drive) cars, and educate our children. It will also change how doctors operate and treat and heal the sick. It is the most important modernization of our infrastructure that we can do until quantum computing is perfected. It is also the single most important national security imperative for the US for the next ten years.

In the race to 5G, it’s clear that the Chinese have an advantage because their government can tell companies “give back the spectrum we licensed to you”, and then reallocate it to where it can be the most effective in winning the 5G race. Spectrum in the US (think radio waves), has been given away or sold for pennies by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for decades. President Lyndon Johnson made $20 million getting the FCC to sell him radio and T.V. spectrum for two Texas stations for pennies back in the 1940s. That certainly has ended in recent years—just in the last four years the FCC has auctioned off two spectrum ranges for more than $50 billion.

Over the past forty years, spectrum for mobile phones, satellite communications and T.V., GPS services, and hundreds of other applications has been awarded by the FCC to jump-start the communications revolution we now take for granted. To fully implement 5G across all communities in the U.S., the FCC must now figure out how to allocate spectrum from the very lowest frequency to incredibly high millimeter wave frequency. The backbone will be (for lack of a better way to describe it) in the middle frequency—or the part that was given away for free to government satellite companies back in the 1960s, that then became the struggling satellite companies of today. This is known as “C-band spectrum”, and you will see the numbers 3.7 to 4.2 gigahertz associated with that band. C-band is what enables you to watch the championship basketball game on cable TV as it is the backhaul for ESPN and other networks.

However, C-band is not the only spectrum needed to fully implement 5G. Lower and higher frequencies are also needed. The trouble is, it’s a trade-off. Low frequency is great at going very long distances and can penetrate buildings, forests, even mountains and oceans if ultra-low frequency. That is how our submarines communicate back to the U.S. from deep within the ocean. The trouble is, low frequency also means low bandwidth. High frequency has enormous bandwidth. But it can only go very short distances, and rain, snow, trees, let alone buildings, can disrupt or block it. That is why at that end of the proposed 5G spectrum, you will need an antenna every couple 100 yards or so versus current cell phone towers today, which are miles apart.

What the FCC must now do is figure out how to get back all this spectrum and auction it to those cellular companies building the 5G backbone. Other countries have recently held highly successful auctions for this spectrum range. Some of the mid-band spectrum is also controlled by the U.S. military—and is essential for radar. Unused portions of this will need to be reallocated to the FCC for auctioning to 5G companies.

This piece originally appeared in Forbes on April 12, 2019.

NYTimes: Russia Sees Midterm Elections as Chance to Sow Fresh Discord, Intelligence Chiefs Warn

This article citing CGA Principal Douglas Lute appeared in the New York Times, February 13, 2018.

WASHINGTON — Russia is already meddling in the midterm elections this year, the top American intelligence officials said on Tuesday, warning that Moscow is using a digital strategy to worsen the country’s political and social divisions.

Russia is using fake accounts on social media — many of them bots — to spread disinformation, the officials said. European elections are being targeted, too, and the attacks were not likely to end this year, they warned.

“We expect Russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false-flag personas, sympathetic spokespeople and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States,” Dan Coats, the director of national intelligence, told the Senate Intelligence Committee at its annual hearing on worldwide threats.

Mr. Coats and the other intelligence chiefs laid out a pair of central challenges for the United States: contending with the flow of Russian misinformation and shoring up the defenses of electoral systems, which are run by individual states and were seen as highly vulnerable in 2016.

“There should be no doubt that Russia perceives its past efforts as successful and views the 2018 U.S. midterm elections as a potential target for Russian influence operations,” said Mr. Coats, testifying alongside Mike Pompeo, the C.I.A. director; Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director; and other leading intelligence officials.


“Throughout the entire community, we have not seen any evidence of any significant change from last year,” Mr. Coats said.

The warnings were striking in their contrast to President Trump’s public comments. He has mocked the very notion of Russian meddling in the last election and lashed out at those who suggested otherwise.

Mr. Trump has not directed his intelligence officials to specifically combat Russian interference, they said. But Mr. Pompeo said that the president has made clear that the C.I.A. has “an obligation, from the foreign intelligence perspective, to do everything we can to make sure there’s a deep and thorough understanding of every threat, including threats from Russia.”

Russia appears eager to spread information — real and fake — that deepens political divisions. Bot armies promoted partisan causes on social media, including the recent push to release a Republican congressional memo critical of law enforcement officials.

The bots have also sought to portray the F.B.I. and Justice Department as infected by partisan bias, said Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, the top Democrat on the intelligence committee.

“Other threats to our institutions come from right here at home,” he said. “There have been some, aided and abetted by Russian internet bots and trolls, who have attacked the basic integrity of the F.B.I. and the Justice Department. This is a dangerous trend.”

Russia does not, however, appear to be trying to penetrate voting machines or Americans’ ballots, United States officials said.

“While scanning and probing of networks happens across the internet every day, we have not seen specific or credible evidence of Russian attempts to infiltrate state election infrastructure like we saw in 2016,” Jeanette Manfra, the chief cybersecurity official at the Department of Homeland Security, said in an interview last week.

Right now, Mr. Pompeo said, Russia is trying to focus on what are known as influence operations — using social media and other platforms to spread favorable messages — not hacking.

“The things we have seen Russia doing to date are mostly focused on information types of warfare,” he said.

Intelligence officials and election-security experts have said both the states and federal agencies have made significant progress in addressing voting system vulnerabilities since 2016, when state-level officials could not even be warned of attacks because they lacked the necessary security clearances.

 

The intelligence community was focused on gathering information about potential attacks and then sharing it with local and state election officials, Mr. Coats said during the hearing.

Mr. Coats called Moscow’s meddling “pervasive.”

“The Russians have a strategy that goes well beyond what is happening in the United States,” he said. “While they have historically tried to do these types of things, clearly in 2016 they upped their game. They took advantage, a sophisticated advantage of social media. They are doing that not only in the United States but doing it throughout Europe and perhaps elsewhere.”

Mr. Pompeo was also asked about reports last week by The New York Times and The Intercept that American intelligence agencies spent months negotiating with a Russian who said he could sell stolen American cyberweapons and that the deal would include purportedly compromising material on Mr. Trump. The negotiations were conducted through an American businessman who lives in Europe and served as a cutout for American intelligence agencies.

Mr. Pompeo called the reporting “atrocious, ridiculous and inaccurate” and said the C.I.A. had not paid the Russian. The Times, citing American and European intelligence officials, said only that American spies had paid the Russian $100,000 for the cyberweapons using an indirect channel. Those weapons were never delivered. The Russian did provide information on Mr. Trump, which intelligence agencies refused to accept and remains with the American businessman.

“Our story was based on numerous interviews, a review of communications and other evidence. We stand by it,” said Dean Baquet, the executive editor of The Times.

Mr. Pompeo did appear to acknowledge the operation itself, saying that “the information that we were working to try and retrieve was information we believed might well have been stolen from the U.S. government.”

He and the other intelligence chiefs, including Adm. Michael S. Rogers, the departing director of the National Security Agency, also addressed the slew of other threats they see facing the United States. They cited North Korea’s nuclear program, Islamist militants in the Middle East and even illicit drug trafficking, especially the smuggling of cheaply made fentanyl, a powerful opioid responsible for thousands of deathseach year.

But as has been the case for years, the intelligence leaders presented cyberactivities of rival nations and rogue groups as the foremost threat facing the United States. They warned that such risks were likely to only grow, citing China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, along with militant groups and criminal networks, as the main agitators.

To ease the flow of information, the Department of Homeland Security is trying to get at least one election official in each state a security clearance. To date, 21 officials in 20 states received at least interim “secret”-level clearances, Ms. Manfra said in the interview.

The federal government is also working to provide states with enhanced online security “to ensure the American people that their vote is sanctioned and well and not manipulated in any way,” Mr. Coats said.

Homeland Security has added 32 states and 31 local governments to a system that scans internet-connected systems in the federal government every night for vulnerabilities, offering weekly reports and fixes to any issues they find, Ms. Manfra said.

Specialists also spend weeks auditing cyberdefense systems in both federal agencies and state elections offices, and last month, the department decided to prioritize requests for the latter to ensure that they get done swiftly, she added.

Virtually every state is taking steps to harden voter databases and election equipment against outside attacks and to strengthen postelection audits. When the National Association of Secretaries of State holds its winter meeting this weekend in Washington, half of the sessions will be devoted wholly or in part to election security.

New standards for voting equipment were approved last fall that will effectively require manufacturers to include several security improvements in new devices. States are moving to scrap voting machines that do not generate an auditable paper ballot as well as an electronic one; Virginia has decertified most of its devices, Pennsylvania has declared that all new devices will produce paper ballots, and Georgia — a state whose outdated equipment produces only electronic voting records — has set up a pilot program to move to paper.

But a host of problems remains. Roughly one-fifth of the country lacks paper ballots, and replacing digital-only machines costs millions of dollars. Federal legislation that would allot funds to speed up the conversion to paper is crawling through Congress.

Many experts, meanwhile, believe that Russian meddling in the presidential race was but a foretaste of what is to come — not just from the Kremlin, but also from other hostile states and private actors.

“Russia learned a lot last year in what really, I think, can be seen as a series of probing attacks,” Douglas Lute, a retired Army lieutenant general, deputy national security adviser to President George W. Bush and ambassador to NATO under President Barack Obama, said in an interview. “I think we should expect that they learned and they’re going to come back in a much more sophisticated way.”

IN-THE-NEWS: CGA's Doug Lute tells USA Today about the national security implications of protecting our election infrastructure

This piece originally appeared in USA Today, December 7, 2017

Illinois' most populous county has a plan to keep hackers out, after the state's voter registration list was breached during last year's presidential race. There's one big sticking point: the money. 

The director of elections for Illinois' Cook County and a group including Ambassador Douglas Lute will present a strategy to bolster U.S. election systems' defenses against foreign intruders on Thursday. 

That roadmap comes with a request for the federal government to fund their plan, underlining a hurdle for many municipalities as they head into the 2018 midterm and 2020 presidential elections.

While last year's general election made clear the voting system was vulnerable to hackers, and the federal government has instructed the nation's 9,000 election officials to make their voting rolls safer, many municipalities lack funding to make these changes. 

The last time there was significant federal funding for election infrastructure at the local level was the Help America Vote Act of 2002, passed in the aftermath of the controversy surrounding the 2000 president election recount. That resulted in almost $3 billion in funds for new voting equipment

"For a relatively modest investment it seems to me that we can shore up the system significantly," Noah Praetz told USA TODAY.

His five-page plan, sponsored by Cook County Clerk David Orr and being presented at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy, is part of a broader effort by an ad hoc bipartisan group working to strengthen the U.S. election system after Russian intrusions during the 2016 U.S. presidential race. It calls on the federal government to aid states, laying out a list of 20 defense tactics election officials can take to protect election integrity.

"Make no mistake, this will be a painful and expensive undertaking," it reads.

Just how expensive isn't known. The U.S. election system is highly decentralized. Each jurisdiction has different staff, equipment and funding and must deal with differing local and state regulations governing elections.

For Cook County, which is responsible only for county-wide elections as the city of Chicago holds its own elections, "it's going to cost many millions." Praetz said he couldn't be more specific because the county is in the middle of a procurement process.

Even hundreds of millions is just "a rounding error of the defense department budget," said Lute, a retired three-star general who served under both Obama and George W. Bush.

"We're buying hard defense for America to the tune of $700 billion a year. And for literally less than one-one-thousandth of that, we could make dramatic inroads to secure our election systems. Which quite frankly may be more fundamental [to our security] than the next fighter plane," he said.

Russia will be back

The problem with Russia, which denied any interference in the U.S. election, isn't going to go away, say election officials. The 2016 attacks were a classic Russian intelligence military operation.

"Initially it is rather clumsy. They probe and they make mistakes and they get found out. But they also learn very quickly. I expect that in 2018 they will be back, with a much more sophisticated and targeted approach," said Lute, most recently the former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s standing political body.

2016 was a heads up

The 2016 election was a watershed in terms of awareness about foreign election meddling. No one knows the problem better than Illinois, one of two states where federal authorities say Russian hackers succeeded in infiltrating the election system.

The hackers operated undetected for three weeks, viewing the records of 90,000 voters and, according to the Illinois State Board of Elections, attempted to delete or alter some voter data.

Time is also short. Illinois also is one of two states with the earliest primaries in the county, meaning its voters will go to the polls in March.

The white paper suggests the creation of a national digital network for local election officials to quickly share information about threats and incidents. This is in contrast to 2016, when officials in 21 states only learned they'd been targeted almost a year after the fact.

Next, every local and state election official should have a security officer on staff, to deal with these issues. 

The paper then goes on to outline a standard list of the things any company would implement to protect the security of its networks, but which election officials have overall been slow to roll out because of a lack of funding, knowledge and awareness of the dangers.

The final suggestion is the idea that every election jurisdiction needs to come up with a plan about how it will recover if it is hacked. That could mean paper backups of voter registration lists, storing paper ballots or saving digital scans of ballots.

"If we detect breaches and recover from them quickly, we will survive. And so will our democracy," the paper says.  

IN-THE-NEWS: CGA's Nate Snyder Participates in Panel with Former CIA Director John Brennan

Cambridge Global Advisors (CGA) is proud to announce the participation of Nate Snyder, former senior counterterrorism official in the Department of Homeland Security and current CGA employee, in last Wednesday's discussion with John Brennan, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the outlook of global security. The event was hosted by The Center on National Security at Fordham University School of Law in New York, where Brennan is Distinguished Fellow for Global Security. It was attended by widely recognized national security thought leaders, published researchers, current CT practitioners, national media, and national security correspondents. 

The conversation was moderated by David Ignatius, columnist for the Washington Post. Video of the conversation can be found here.  

IN-THE-NEWS: Announcing IBM's Newest Research Report Topics

CGA Principals Douglas Lute & Francis Taylor were announced in IBM's Center for the Business of Government latest round of awards for new reports on key public sector challenges.  These awards and projects respond to priorities identified in the Center's research agenda and the content is intended to stimulate and accelerate the production of practical research that benefits public sector leaders and managers.

Lute and Taylor's report is expected in early 2018. A short summary is below:

"Integrating and Analyzing Data Within and Across Government: Key to 21st Century Security"

This report will focus on data gathering, analysis and dissemination challenges across the homeland security enterprise. It will address how these challenges will help DHS and stakeholders in the US and Europe increase the understanding of how best to leverage technology in meeting strategic, mission and operational needs. The report will highlight opportunities for governments to leverage data integration and analytics to support better decision making around cyber and homeland security. 

Click here to view a full list of other award winners.

IN-THE-NEWS: Can more U.S. troops in Afghanistan help end the war?

As part of the Trump administration's review of America's 16-year war in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary James Mattis announced that the president has given him the authority to decide appropriate troop levels. The U.S. commander in that country has recommended boosting the number by thousands more. PBS Newshour's William Brangham speaks with CGA Principal and retired Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, former U.S. ambassador to NATO.

COMMENTARY: A Political Surge is What's Needed in Afghanistan

By: Doug Lute

As the Trump Administration considers options to break the stalemate in the 15-year war in Afghanistan, it is important to look beyond military approaches. 

The roots of Afghanistan's problems require a political surge in support of President Ashraf Ghani’s government.

For too long American policy has fixated on the security situation and the military means required to address it. The military effort has been a shiny object that has captured our attention while the political roots of the war and potential political approaches to resolving it have been discounted, under-resourced, or even ignored.  Military tools alone can sustain the current stalemate, but not reverse it.  Adding a few thousand or even many more troops will not substantially change the situation. Ending the war primarily through military means is a mirage.The security stalemate is a symptom of three inter-related political stalemates: in Kabul within the Afghan government, regionally with Afghanistan's neighbors, and ultimately between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. First, weak Afghan governance, zero-sum politics and endemic corruption fuel the Taliban insurgency. The compromise that formed the National Unity Government in the wake of the disputed 2014 presidential election resolved the immediate political crisis, but the parties have been unable to move beyond narrow partisan interests.

Now key political milestones are on the horizon: parliamentary elections in 2018; presidential elections in 2019; and in 2020 the next installment of international funding for Afghan security forces, the civilian government and development support. Success at these milestones depends mainly on the Afghan government’s moving beyond stalemate, not on how many U.S. troops are on the ground.

Second, Afghanistan's relations with key neighbors are also stalemated, especially with Pakistan where Taliban leaders enjoy a safe haven, but also with Russia and Iran. For its part, U.S. attempts at regional approaches to stabilizing Afghanistan have not been effective due to competing, higher priority interests. In Pakistan, U.S. core interests include suppressing terrorist groups with trans-national reach including the remnants of core al Qaeda, internal stability in a country with the world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal, and the stability of the often tense Pakistan-India relations. 

U.S. interests with Russia focus on Ukraine, challenges to NATO, the crisis in Syria, and interference in democratic processes in the U.S. and other democracies. Our priority interests with Iran are her destabilizing activities across the Middle East including support for the Assad government in Syria, the implementation of the nuclear agreement, and the potential for military miscalculation in the Gulf. With China, too, though our interests in Afghanistan largely converge, we have interests more important than stabilizing Afghanistan. The net effect is that we have tended to discount regional approaches and focused on stabilizing Afghanistan from within, which cannot possibly work.

Finally, despite years of trying we have yet to gain traction on an Afghan-led political approach to the Taliban. The Taliban are not going away and will not be defeated by military means alone. The war in Afghanistan will end with a political settlement, not a military victory.  Some argue that recent Taliban battlefield gains diminish their interest in pursuing talks with the Afghan government and before talks we must dominate militarily. The security situation is actually stalemated with both sides suffering heavy attrition. We should consider anew with our Afghan partner what it would take to move towards a political settlement, using both military means and political compromise to improve chances of success.

In Afghanistan, the Trump Administration — like its two predecessors — encounters a case where political approaches will prove decisive in the long run. As in all conflicts, military tools are only a means to a political end. We should focus on what matters most: breaking the three political stalemates. What we need is a political surge. 

Douglas Lute is a former NSC official in the Bush and Obama Administrations responsible for coordinating US policy in Afghanistan and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO (2013-17). He is also a Senior Fellow with Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

COMMENTARY: The Message NATO Needs to Hear from Trump

By: Doug Lute

Last July, the 28 leaders of NATO’s member states met in Warsaw, Poland, to confront the most severe challenges to security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. A series of disorienting events began in 2014 with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, a part of sovereign Ukraine. This was the first instance of using force to change borders in Europe in over 70 years. President Vladimir Putin had violated blatantly every agreement that had governed the long peace, including the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. A few months later Putin moved further, using the Russian military and covert means to sponsor separatist proxies and destabilize two key provinces in eastern Ukraine. Russia also challenged NATO more directly with an ambitious military modernization program, aggressive new doctrine, and numerous large exercises that violated agreements designed to promote transparency and stability. At the same time, to NATO’s south, the instability in Syria and Iraq enabled the Islamic State to declare a caliphate after seizing large swathes of territory including Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul. Meanwhile, the largest mass migration since World War II arrived on the borders of Europe.

These events combined to stun NATO, bringing a sense of urgency to the summit. The 28 NATO leaders gathered at Warsaw were forced to respond to the most severe set of security challenges in Europe in over 25 years. NATO stood at a pivotal moment, faced with diverse challenges coming from outside the alliance.

Over the two-day summit, the program featured NATO’s traditional format: long sessions focused on discrete topics in which the leaders were all given the floor for several minutes. In these sessions, NATO members took decisions to refocus on collective defense, resetting deterrence for the new conditions in the East. To the South, they agreed that NATO had to do more to promote stability among the weak or failed states along its periphery. They extended support to Afghanistan where NATO had led the coalition since 2006, committing 12,000 troops and financing for Afghan forces. Closer to home, Ukraine’s president gave a firsthand account of his nation’s struggle against Russian aggression. To provide the resources required for all this, leaders reaffirmed their commitment to move toward providing 2 percent of GDP to defense. It was a full agenda, focused outward beyond NATO.

Late on July 8, President Barack Obama joined the other leaders, after a long day of travel and tackling a substantive agenda, for a formal working dinner. The setting was symbolic: they dined in the room where the Warsaw Treaty had been signed in 1955, setting up the 8-nation alliance led by the Soviet Union that faced off against NATO during the Cold War. Poland’s leaders were proud to point out the irony. While the leaders met alone for the dinner, a few key staff from each nation gathered tightly into a small adjacent room equipped with an audio-video link to the dinner room, modest sandwiches and too little wine.

The dinner was to focus on NATO’s relationship with Russia, its largest and most militarily capable neighbor. A vibrant discussion unfolded, making clear the diverse perspectives across the alliance. There was consensus that NATO’s attempt since the end of the Cold War to fashion a strategic partnership with Moscow had been hijacked by Putin’s aggressive actions. In response, some allies placed first priority on strengthening NATO’s defenses. Others were challenged more directly by the threats of terrorism, mass migration, and instability to the south. Some believed there were still areas in which to engage Moscow; others were skeptical. As the dinner discussion moved slowly around the large table, a compromise emerged. NATO agreed to strike a balance between strength and dialogue: the alliance would do what was required to deter Russia while also remaining open to dialogue to attempt to reduce risks. NATO would remain the mature, responsible player in Europe.

Near the end of the dinner — while those of us the crowded staff room were counting the last interventions and hoping for brevity — came the most important message of the summit. Obama had spoken early and then listened to all the others. Many leaders lamented Putin’s actions and the Russian challenge to Europe, including disinformation campaigns and malign influence among domestic political parties. Some implied that illegal migrants, not Russia, posed the most severe threat and justified strong responses. At the end of a long dinner and a very long day, Obama unexpectedly raised his hand to speak a second time. He spoke without notes. He said that the United States would respond to Russia, but that the more severe threat to our democracies comes not from outside, not from Putin, but from inside our own societies. He said that xenophobia, anti-migration policies, and unconstrained nationalism could erode our democracies from within. He said that if we drift from our core values, we could lose all that has been built up over the past 70 years. This was not about Putin; it was about us. Everyone fell silent as the dinner concluded.

As President Donald Trump prepares to meet his counterparts for the first time at NATO headquarters in Brussels this week, it is worth recalling this message from a year ago. Troops, tanks, ships, and planes are not the core of NATO’s strength. At the core of the strongest, most durable, most successful alliance in history are its common values — democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. Values are the glue that binds NATO’s 28 diverse nations together. Today these values are being challenged from multiple directions, including from the inside. Protecting these values is vital to America’s security and it’s a process that begins at home — in all 28 member capitals. This is again the message NATO needs to hear.

This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy on May 23, 2017.

PRESS RELEASE: Former U.S. Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary Francis X. Taylor Joins Cambridge Global Advisors as Principal

May 4, 2017 (Washington, DC) – Today, Cambridge Global Advisors (CGA) announced that Francis X. Taylor, former Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), will join CGA as a Principal and Senior Advisor, advising on a variety of government, NGO, corporate and non-profit client projects in the national security and global affairs space.

At DHS, from 2014-2017, Taylor oversaw and carried out the mission of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, equipping the Homeland Security Enterprise with the timely intelligence and information required to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. 

Before his DHS appointment, Taylor served as Vice President and Chief Security Officer for the General Electric Company (GE) and was responsible for GE's security operations and emergency management processes. Taylor also had a distinguished career in public and military service, including serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security and as the US Ambassador at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the Department of State from 2001-2002. During his 31-year military career, Taylor achieved the rank of Brigadier General and oversaw counterintelligence and security operations for the US Air Force.

Of the recent appointment, Jake Braun, CEO of Cambridge Global Advisors said: “A home for many other former leaders at the Department of Homeland security, Cambridge Global is proud welcome Frank Taylor to our team. He brings a depth of knowledge and demonstrated leadership managing security operations in the military, government and corporate arenas.  We are pleased to be able to offer our clients the benefit of Frank Taylor’s high-level experience in the public and private sectors.”