IN-THE-NEWS: Can more U.S. troops in Afghanistan help end the war?

As part of the Trump administration's review of America's 16-year war in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary James Mattis announced that the president has given him the authority to decide appropriate troop levels. The U.S. commander in that country has recommended boosting the number by thousands more. PBS Newshour's William Brangham speaks with CGA Principal and retired Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, former U.S. ambassador to NATO.

COMMENTARY: A Political Surge is What's Needed in Afghanistan

By: Doug Lute

As the Trump Administration considers options to break the stalemate in the 15-year war in Afghanistan, it is important to look beyond military approaches. 

The roots of Afghanistan's problems require a political surge in support of President Ashraf Ghani’s government.

For too long American policy has fixated on the security situation and the military means required to address it. The military effort has been a shiny object that has captured our attention while the political roots of the war and potential political approaches to resolving it have been discounted, under-resourced, or even ignored.  Military tools alone can sustain the current stalemate, but not reverse it.  Adding a few thousand or even many more troops will not substantially change the situation. Ending the war primarily through military means is a mirage.The security stalemate is a symptom of three inter-related political stalemates: in Kabul within the Afghan government, regionally with Afghanistan's neighbors, and ultimately between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. First, weak Afghan governance, zero-sum politics and endemic corruption fuel the Taliban insurgency. The compromise that formed the National Unity Government in the wake of the disputed 2014 presidential election resolved the immediate political crisis, but the parties have been unable to move beyond narrow partisan interests.

Now key political milestones are on the horizon: parliamentary elections in 2018; presidential elections in 2019; and in 2020 the next installment of international funding for Afghan security forces, the civilian government and development support. Success at these milestones depends mainly on the Afghan government’s moving beyond stalemate, not on how many U.S. troops are on the ground.

Second, Afghanistan's relations with key neighbors are also stalemated, especially with Pakistan where Taliban leaders enjoy a safe haven, but also with Russia and Iran. For its part, U.S. attempts at regional approaches to stabilizing Afghanistan have not been effective due to competing, higher priority interests. In Pakistan, U.S. core interests include suppressing terrorist groups with trans-national reach including the remnants of core al Qaeda, internal stability in a country with the world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal, and the stability of the often tense Pakistan-India relations. 

U.S. interests with Russia focus on Ukraine, challenges to NATO, the crisis in Syria, and interference in democratic processes in the U.S. and other democracies. Our priority interests with Iran are her destabilizing activities across the Middle East including support for the Assad government in Syria, the implementation of the nuclear agreement, and the potential for military miscalculation in the Gulf. With China, too, though our interests in Afghanistan largely converge, we have interests more important than stabilizing Afghanistan. The net effect is that we have tended to discount regional approaches and focused on stabilizing Afghanistan from within, which cannot possibly work.

Finally, despite years of trying we have yet to gain traction on an Afghan-led political approach to the Taliban. The Taliban are not going away and will not be defeated by military means alone. The war in Afghanistan will end with a political settlement, not a military victory.  Some argue that recent Taliban battlefield gains diminish their interest in pursuing talks with the Afghan government and before talks we must dominate militarily. The security situation is actually stalemated with both sides suffering heavy attrition. We should consider anew with our Afghan partner what it would take to move towards a political settlement, using both military means and political compromise to improve chances of success.

In Afghanistan, the Trump Administration — like its two predecessors — encounters a case where political approaches will prove decisive in the long run. As in all conflicts, military tools are only a means to a political end. We should focus on what matters most: breaking the three political stalemates. What we need is a political surge. 

Douglas Lute is a former NSC official in the Bush and Obama Administrations responsible for coordinating US policy in Afghanistan and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO (2013-17). He is also a Senior Fellow with Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

COMMENTARY: The Message NATO Needs to Hear from Trump

By: Doug Lute

Last July, the 28 leaders of NATO’s member states met in Warsaw, Poland, to confront the most severe challenges to security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. A series of disorienting events began in 2014 with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, a part of sovereign Ukraine. This was the first instance of using force to change borders in Europe in over 70 years. President Vladimir Putin had violated blatantly every agreement that had governed the long peace, including the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. A few months later Putin moved further, using the Russian military and covert means to sponsor separatist proxies and destabilize two key provinces in eastern Ukraine. Russia also challenged NATO more directly with an ambitious military modernization program, aggressive new doctrine, and numerous large exercises that violated agreements designed to promote transparency and stability. At the same time, to NATO’s south, the instability in Syria and Iraq enabled the Islamic State to declare a caliphate after seizing large swathes of territory including Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul. Meanwhile, the largest mass migration since World War II arrived on the borders of Europe.

These events combined to stun NATO, bringing a sense of urgency to the summit. The 28 NATO leaders gathered at Warsaw were forced to respond to the most severe set of security challenges in Europe in over 25 years. NATO stood at a pivotal moment, faced with diverse challenges coming from outside the alliance.

Over the two-day summit, the program featured NATO’s traditional format: long sessions focused on discrete topics in which the leaders were all given the floor for several minutes. In these sessions, NATO members took decisions to refocus on collective defense, resetting deterrence for the new conditions in the East. To the South, they agreed that NATO had to do more to promote stability among the weak or failed states along its periphery. They extended support to Afghanistan where NATO had led the coalition since 2006, committing 12,000 troops and financing for Afghan forces. Closer to home, Ukraine’s president gave a firsthand account of his nation’s struggle against Russian aggression. To provide the resources required for all this, leaders reaffirmed their commitment to move toward providing 2 percent of GDP to defense. It was a full agenda, focused outward beyond NATO.

Late on July 8, President Barack Obama joined the other leaders, after a long day of travel and tackling a substantive agenda, for a formal working dinner. The setting was symbolic: they dined in the room where the Warsaw Treaty had been signed in 1955, setting up the 8-nation alliance led by the Soviet Union that faced off against NATO during the Cold War. Poland’s leaders were proud to point out the irony. While the leaders met alone for the dinner, a few key staff from each nation gathered tightly into a small adjacent room equipped with an audio-video link to the dinner room, modest sandwiches and too little wine.

The dinner was to focus on NATO’s relationship with Russia, its largest and most militarily capable neighbor. A vibrant discussion unfolded, making clear the diverse perspectives across the alliance. There was consensus that NATO’s attempt since the end of the Cold War to fashion a strategic partnership with Moscow had been hijacked by Putin’s aggressive actions. In response, some allies placed first priority on strengthening NATO’s defenses. Others were challenged more directly by the threats of terrorism, mass migration, and instability to the south. Some believed there were still areas in which to engage Moscow; others were skeptical. As the dinner discussion moved slowly around the large table, a compromise emerged. NATO agreed to strike a balance between strength and dialogue: the alliance would do what was required to deter Russia while also remaining open to dialogue to attempt to reduce risks. NATO would remain the mature, responsible player in Europe.

Near the end of the dinner — while those of us the crowded staff room were counting the last interventions and hoping for brevity — came the most important message of the summit. Obama had spoken early and then listened to all the others. Many leaders lamented Putin’s actions and the Russian challenge to Europe, including disinformation campaigns and malign influence among domestic political parties. Some implied that illegal migrants, not Russia, posed the most severe threat and justified strong responses. At the end of a long dinner and a very long day, Obama unexpectedly raised his hand to speak a second time. He spoke without notes. He said that the United States would respond to Russia, but that the more severe threat to our democracies comes not from outside, not from Putin, but from inside our own societies. He said that xenophobia, anti-migration policies, and unconstrained nationalism could erode our democracies from within. He said that if we drift from our core values, we could lose all that has been built up over the past 70 years. This was not about Putin; it was about us. Everyone fell silent as the dinner concluded.

As President Donald Trump prepares to meet his counterparts for the first time at NATO headquarters in Brussels this week, it is worth recalling this message from a year ago. Troops, tanks, ships, and planes are not the core of NATO’s strength. At the core of the strongest, most durable, most successful alliance in history are its common values — democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. Values are the glue that binds NATO’s 28 diverse nations together. Today these values are being challenged from multiple directions, including from the inside. Protecting these values is vital to America’s security and it’s a process that begins at home — in all 28 member capitals. This is again the message NATO needs to hear.

This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy on May 23, 2017.

CGA COMMENTARY: Why going small is not always the best cyber strategy

By: Chris Cummiskey, CGA Senior Advisor

**Note: This piece originally appeared in Fifth Domain Cyber, an affiliate of C4ISRNET, Federal Times and DefenseNews.**

In recent years, there has been a strong push in federal departments and agencies to emphasize the need for awarding contracts to small business. This strategy has been further re-enforced by the Small Business Administration that issues regular scorecards to show which agencies meet predetermined percentage targets for small business contract awards.

During my tenure as the acting undersecretary for management and chief acquisition officer at the Department of Homeland Security, I worked closely with our procurement teams to generate a string of “A” grades from SBA in meeting our targets.

Today, of the $13 billion or so DHS awards each year, about one-third goes to small business, while about a third goes to medium sized and large businesses each. This has led to DHS being recognized as one of the leading departments in working with small business.

There are many places in government where a small business procurement strategy is efficient and effective, yet cybersecurity is not necessarily one of those areas. My experience is that government procurement and program officials are dedicated professionals who seek to craft the best acquisition approach based on the requirements. There are, however, a growing number of instances in cyber contracting where a shift to small business could have a detrimental impact. The pressure to meet small business goals, and the feeling among many that small businesses are more flexible and less expensive,  has led to decisions, particularly with cyber contracts, to craft a strategy that is high-risk and counterproductive.

There are several considerations that need examination when crafting a successful cyber procurement approach. These include past performance, program complexity, scale, staffing and pricing.

Past Performance

Demonstrating successful past performance is a key indicator of future success in government contracting. This track record is an important consideration in evaluating which companies can effectively execute often complex federal cyber requirements.

Given the sensitivity and complexity of the cyber mission, it is essential that contracting officers carefully weigh past performance in their evaluation criteria. In this scoring process, well established companies with extensive government experience will certainly have an advantage, but the resulting lower risk to the mission is clearly an important consideration given the cybersecurity climate today.

Program Complexity

Providing cyber defenses in federal agencies has become a challenging and complex undertaking. DHS has been tasked by Congress and the White House with protecting federal networks, while serving as the lead agency for sharing information with the private sector. These vital cyber missions are executed through programs such as Einstein and Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) and centers like the NCCIC and US-CERT.

There is only a subset of companies that have the necessary cyber technical capabilities, large-scale integration experience and processes to effectively run these types of programs.

Breaking cyber contracts up into smaller pieces for the promise of lower cost and more agility can sound promising, yet these promises often go unfulfilled. In reality, what most often occurs is the government themselves will need to integrate across the pieces, potentially compromising the cyber mission, and stressing an already under-staffed government professional team. When coupled with other emerging technological advancements and qualifications, this will continue to be an area where small business will struggle to compete.

Scalability

Another area where small business will have difficulty in meeting requirements of the cyber mission is with scalability. Many successful cyber programs that start as pilots or trial runs eventually end up having to be brought to scale.

As an example, Einstein 3 Accelerated (E3A) started with a relatively modest number of seats covered, yet after the OPM debacle the political will materialized to bring the cyber protection to all 2 million seats in the federal government. Once the decision was made to expand E3A, there was little time to debate whether or not the vendors would be able to accommodate the request. Immediate action to rapidly scale the capability was an imperative.

Staffing

It is not hard to see that there is shortage of skilled cyber employees. Professionals in cyber-related fields have many options today. They can work for the alphabet soup of government agencies that work the cyber mission or they can choose an often more lucrative track in the private sector.

Large government cyber programs need talented and capable personnel in the seats. Often, that means hiring private sector companies to assist with staffing and capabilities. This can be a very good option if the company has solid internal controls for maintaining high quality, cleared cyber staff who receive ongoing training. Small business often has trouble competing to attract and retain high caliber cyber talent.

Pricing

One of the regular arguments one hears about awarding to small business is they are just cheaper than some of the larger outfits. In some cases that may be true, but again, in most cyber procurements that may be an illusion.

A better metric for government cyber than Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) should be Best Value. It is not unusual for smaller companies to low ball their pricing on a RFP with the hopes of winning the award. Once secured, they sometimes struggle to meet the contract deliverables, terms and conditions. This is a dangerous trap door for government procurement officials. They are often pressed to reduce contract cost, while not sacrificing functionality.

In too many cases, the government finds out too late that program performance has suffered due to an award to a small business that just can’t get the job done.

Conclusion

These observations are not meant to slam the small business community. There are plenty of areas in federal contracting where small business is the best choice. Unfortunately, large scale government cyber is not one of those places.

Past performance, program complexity, scalability, staffing and pricing all factor into sound federal procurement decision-making. At the start of a new administration, I hope the incoming teams of appointees will take a hard look at how federal cybersecurity is planned, procured and executed to ensure the best results.

Chris Cummiskey is a former acting undersecretary/deputy undersecretary for management and chief acquisition officer at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

PRESS RELEASE: Former U.S. Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary Francis X. Taylor Joins Cambridge Global Advisors as Principal

May 4, 2017 (Washington, DC) – Today, Cambridge Global Advisors (CGA) announced that Francis X. Taylor, former Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), will join CGA as a Principal and Senior Advisor, advising on a variety of government, NGO, corporate and non-profit client projects in the national security and global affairs space.

At DHS, from 2014-2017, Taylor oversaw and carried out the mission of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, equipping the Homeland Security Enterprise with the timely intelligence and information required to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. 

Before his DHS appointment, Taylor served as Vice President and Chief Security Officer for the General Electric Company (GE) and was responsible for GE's security operations and emergency management processes. Taylor also had a distinguished career in public and military service, including serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security and as the US Ambassador at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the Department of State from 2001-2002. During his 31-year military career, Taylor achieved the rank of Brigadier General and oversaw counterintelligence and security operations for the US Air Force.

Of the recent appointment, Jake Braun, CEO of Cambridge Global Advisors said: “A home for many other former leaders at the Department of Homeland security, Cambridge Global is proud welcome Frank Taylor to our team. He brings a depth of knowledge and demonstrated leadership managing security operations in the military, government and corporate arenas.  We are pleased to be able to offer our clients the benefit of Frank Taylor’s high-level experience in the public and private sectors.”